Peter Meier
a2ca0db9ca
Security:
- cms-images / cms-files now share resolveCmsSource (cms-source.server.ts)
which enforces an allowlist: asset filename, absolute path on the CMS
host, or full URL exact-matching the configured CMS host+protocol.
Foreign hosts, protocol-relative URLs and path traversal return 400.
- markdown-safe.ts is the single configured marked entrypoint; it
disables raw HTML rendering globally (renderer.html() returns ''),
removing the inline script/iframe injection vector via markdown.
All 8 marked imports across components and loaders now go through it.
- sanitize-blocks.server.ts walks resolved page/post content and runs
HtmlBlock html fields through sanitize-html with a tight allowlist
(no script/style/on*, only youtube/vimeo/spotify iframes, mailto/tel
plus http(s) schemes, target=_blank gets rel=noopener).
- Webhook tokens (revalidate, cache/clear) compared via
crypto.timingSafeEqual through auth-token.server.ts.
- cms.ts wraps every fetch in cmsFetch(): 5 s default timeout via
AbortSignal.timeout, override per call or globally via
PUBLIC_CMS_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS. Stops slow CMS responses from pinning
SSR workers indefinitely.
Observability:
- log.server.ts gives logWarn / logError / logInfo with scope + context;
swallowed catch {} blocks in hooks, layout.server, +page.server,
[...slug]/+page.server and sitemap now log instead of going silent.
Routing:
- Legacy /blog, /blog/page/:n, /blog/tag/:t and /p/:slug stub routes
deleted; their 301 redirects moved into hooks.server.ts so the
request never enters the SvelteKit page pipeline.
Tests (vitest, server-side):
- auth-token.server.test.ts (6 cases for constant-time compare)
- cms-source.server.test.ts (8 cases for SSRF allowlist)
- sanitize-blocks.server.test.ts (9 cases for sanitizer + walker)
All 23 green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
17 lines
631 B
TypeScript
17 lines
631 B
TypeScript
/**
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* Konstantzeitvergleich für Auth-Tokens (Webhook-Secrets, API-Keys).
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*
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* `a !== b` leakt timing-Information; `crypto.timingSafeEqual` vergleicht in
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* O(n) immer alle Bytes. Längen-Mismatch wird vorab geprüft, weil
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* `timingSafeEqual` bei ungleicher Länge wirft.
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*/
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import { timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
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export function constantTimeEqual(a: string | null | undefined, b: string | null | undefined): boolean {
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if (a == null || b == null) return false;
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const ab = Buffer.from(a, 'utf8');
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const bb = Buffer.from(b, 'utf8');
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if (ab.length !== bb.length) return false;
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return timingSafeEqual(ab, bb);
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}
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